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Abstract
Our collaboration has designed, installed, and operated a compact antineutrino
detector at a nuclear power station, for the purpose of monitoring the power and
plutonium content of the reactor core. This paper focuses on the basic properties and
performance of the detector. We describe the site, the reactor source, and the detec-
tor, and provide data that clearly show the expected antineutrino signal. Our data
and experience demonstrate that it is possible to operate a simple, relatively small,
antineutrino detector near a reactor, in a non-intrusive and unattended mode for
months to years at a time, from outside the reactor containment, with no disruption
of day-to-day operations at the reactor site. This unique real-time cooperative mon-
itoring capability may be of interest for the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) reactor safeguards program and similar regimes.
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1 Introduction
The IAEA uses an ensemble of procedures and technologies, collectively re-
ferred to as the Safeguards Regime, to detect diversion of fissile materials
from civil nuclear fuel cycle facilities into weapons programs. The research
described here concerns safeguards for one important element of this cycle,
nuclear reactors. Earlier work [1,2] has described a method for exploiting the
large number (≈ 1021 ν¯/s) of antineutrinos emitted by fission reactors to track
the plutonium content and thermal power of the reactor core in real time.
This approach offers unique advantages that are complimentary to existing
safeguards methods. The potential impact on the regime is large, inasmuch as
over 200 of the world’s civil power reactors, located in some 30 countries, are
subject to IAEA safeguards [3].
To be useful for reactor safeguards, antineutrino detectors must be simpler to
construct and operate than the current generation of detectors, which were
built to investigate the basic physics of the neutrino sector. It is in this respect
that this work differs from the experimental effort described in [1]. Further-
more, an experimental deployment at a commercial reactor is essential to
demonstrate the potential of this technology to the global non-proliferation
community.
In this paper, we describe the characteristics and performance of such a de-
vice; a simple, compact prototype antineutrino detector, “SONGS1”, which
has been installed at a commercial nuclear power station to demonstrate the
feasibility of this monitoring technique.
2 Reactor Monitoring with Antineutrino Detectors
In the context of nuclear nonproliferation, cooperative monitoring refers to the
tracking of nuclear inventories and nuclear facilities with the agreement of the
host country. The IAEA Safeguards Regime is the most prominent example of
such monitoring. Antineutrinos have unique features that make them interest-
ing for the purpose of cooperative monitoring of nuclear reactors. The highly
penetrating nature of the particle and the high flux near reactors means that
relatively small detectors external to the reactor can acquire a signal useful
for monitoring, even with hour to day integration times. Furthermore, over
a broad range of antineutrino energies, the ratio of antineutrinos per fission
and MeV emitted by uranium and plutonium varies by factors of 50–90% [4].
As a result, as uranium is consumed and plutonium produced in the core, the
measured antineutrino rate and spectrum will change, providing up to date
information about the burnup and isotopic content of the core.
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For example, during a typical 1–1.5 year cycle at a pressurized water reac-
tor (PWR), the net effect on the antineutrino rate due to the fissile isotopic
evolution is 6–12%. Information about the reactor’s fissile content is a key
element of the IAEA safeguards regime, whose purpose is to detect unautho-
rized diversion of fissile material from civil nuclear fuel cycles. Antineutrino
detectors can supply this information in real time and in a manner wholly un-
der the control of the safeguards agent, without interfering with daily reactor
operations. Because of these interesting features, antineutrino detection holds
promise as a complementary technique for IAEA and other reactor safeguards
regimes.
2.1 Relative and Absolute Measurements
In neutrino physics experiments that require an absolute flux or spectral mea-
surement, considerable effort must be devoted to a full understanding of the
absolute efficiency of the detector. In safeguards regimes, both relative and
absolute measurements may be of use. Relative measurements, in which the
antineutrino rate or spectrum is compared to some initial value, are insensi-
tive to time-independent systematic shifts in the detector response, such as
an error in an estimate of the detection efficiency. For such measurements, a
detailed understanding of the individual detector’s efficiency is therefore not
required, so long as the detector response is stable in time. In the analysis
presented here, we have estimated the efficiency of the SONGS1 detector us-
ing a simple detector simulation. We emphasize that the potential utility of
the detector for safeguards does not depend on a precise knowledge of this
efficiency.
3 Site and Reactor Characteristics
The SONGS1 detector is deployed at Unit 2 of the San Onofre Nuclear Gen-
erating Station (SONGS). There are two operational reactors at this sta-
tion; both are pressurized water reactors designed by Combustion Engineer-
ing in the 1970s and have maximum thermal (electric) power of 3.4 GWth
(1.1 GWelec).
The detector is located in the tendon gallery of Unit 2 (Fig. 1). A feature of
many commercial reactors [5,6,7,8,9], a tendon gallery is an annular concrete
hall that lies beneath the walls of the reactor containment structure. It is
used to inspect and adjust the tension in reinforcing steel cables which extend
throughout the concrete of the containment structure. At SONGS these in-










Fig. 1. A cross section of the SONGS Unit 2 containment building showing the
position of the reactor vessel and tendon gallery.
handful of representative tendons. Subsequently, the placement of the detector
in the tendon gallery has little or no impact on regular plant operations.
SONGS1 is located 24.5± 1.0 m from the Unit 2 reactor core and 149± 3 m
from that of Unit 3. Since the antineutrino flux generated by each core is
isotropic, 97% of the reactor antineutrinos reaching the SONGS1 detector
originate from Unit 2. With Unit 2 at full power the antineutrino flux at the
SONGS1 location is ≈ 1017 m−2s−1.
It is worth noting that at this position the flux of other particles, in particular
fast neutrons and gamma rays, reaching the detector from the reactor core is
practically zero. For example, the material between the core and the detector
corresponds to nearly 100 attenuation lengths for 10 MeV neutrons, compared
with a total flux exiting the reactor that is no greater than 108 cm2s−1. This
yields a vanishingly small reactor neutron flux in the gallery. Similar arguments
apply for reactor produced gamma rays.
The tendon gallery is located about 10 m below the surface, providing ≈
25 meters of water equivalent (mwe) overburden which eliminates the soft
component of the cosmic ray flux and reduces the muonic component by a
factor of 7 [10]. An important purpose of this prototype deployment was to
determine whether cosmic ray induced backgrounds at this relatively shallow
depth would overwhelm the reactor antineutrino signal in a simple detector.
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The temperature in the tendon gallery is not actively controlled. Due to the
underground location diurnal temperature variations at the detector are small
(< 0.1 ◦C), although there is a slow seasonal variation of up to 5 ◦C. Small
drifts in detector gain that result from this variation are accounted for via the
detector calibration procedure (Sec. 9).
In the context of cooperative monitoring, tendon galleries are ideal locations
for antineutrino detectors. They are remote from daily reactor operations,
provide significant overburden, and are as close as possible to the core while
remaining outside of containment.
4 Antineutrino Interactions in Liquid Scintillator
Antineutrinos are detected via the inverse beta decay process on quasi-free
protons in hydrogenous scintillator: ν¯e + p → e+ + n. The positron (e+) and
neutron (n) are detected in close time coincidence, allowing strong rejection
of the much more frequent singles backgrounds due to natural radioactivity or
neutron production. The positron deposits energy via Bethe-Bloch ionization
as it slows in the scintillator, and upon annihilation with an electron, emits
two gamma rays which can deposit up to an additional 1.022 MeV of energy.
Because the ionization and annihilation gamma ray energy depositions are ef-
fectively simultaneous, and promptly follow the antineutrino interaction, this
combination of energy depositions is measured as a single event in the detector,
referred to as the “prompt” energy deposition. Assuming complete contain-
ment of the event, the prompt energy and the antineutrino energy are directly
related through the equation:
Eν = Eprompt + 1.8 MeV − 2 ·me. (1)
In the current detector, this ideal relation is distorted by escape of 0.511 MeV
annihilation gamma rays that are created near the edge of the detector. Monte
Carlo transport simulations account for this loss of energy, and allow for a full
analysis of the deposited energy spectrum as well as providing an estimate of
the efficiency for detection of the prompt energy (Sec. 8.4).
The neutron carries away a few keV of energy from the antineutrino inter-
action [11] and is detected by capture on a Gadolinium (Gd) dopant. The
liquid scintillator is doped at 0.1% by weight with natural Gd, which is cho-
sen for its very high neutron capture cross-section. The Gd doping yields a
neutron capture time of 28 µs and an energy release of ≈ 8 MeV via a gamma
ray cascade, compared to a capture time of 200 µs and energy release of
2.2 MeV for capture on hydrogen. The interactions in the detector resulting
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from this 8 MeV cascade are referred to as the “delayed” energy deposition.
As with the positron, the measured energy in the detector is somewhat less
than 8 MeV since some of the cascade gamma rays escape the detector volume
without depositing their full energy. Still, the increase in deposited energy and
the decrease in the time interval combine to significantly improve the overall
background rejection capability relative to capture in undoped scintillator.
We can therefore expect to observe two classes of events in a detector based
upon Gd loaded liquid scintillator. The first, referred to here as correlated
events, involve a prompt energy deposition associated with a neutron that is
captured a short time later on a Gd nucleus. The time separation between
prompt and delayed energy depositions will follow an exponential distribution
with time constant equal to the neutron capture time of the Gd doped scintilla-
tor (28 µs). The second class, referred to as uncorrelated backgrounds, involves
the random “coincidence” of two independent energy depositions caused by
natural backgrounds. We refer to these individual energy depositions as “sin-
gles.” Since these backgrounds obey Poisson statistics, the time separation
between singles will also follow an exponential distribution with time con-
stant equal to the inverse of the singles rate (effectively the detector trigger
rate).
Unfortunately, antineutrino interactions are not the only events that produce
correlated events in the detector. For example, fast neutrons, produced by
muon capture or muon spallation [12,13,14], can scatter off protons in the
scintillator, giving a prompt energy deposition, and then be captured on Gd
with the characteristic time distribution. Therefore, observation of correlated
events alone is not sufficient to measure the reactor antineutrino flux – the
correlated background rate must also be determined. Accurate a priori cal-
culations of the background are difficult since they depend strongly upon the
geometry and composition of the detector surroundings. In practice, one must
wait for a reactor off period to measure the correlated background rate.
5 SONGS1 Detector Description
The SONGS1 detector consists of three subsystems; a central detector con-
taining the Gd-doped liquid scintillator target and photomultiplier tubes, a
passive water or polyethylene shield on all sides, and a plastic scintillator muon
veto system placed outside the water shield on five sides of the detector.
In addition to the detector itself the installation at SONGS includes the Data
Acquisition System (DAQ, Sec. 7) and a computer that automatically per-
forms the data analysis described in Sec. 10. A modem is used to automat-
ically retrieve the results of this analysis as well as detector state of health
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indicators, allowing for the remote monitoring of the detector, and indeed of
reactor operation. The SONGS1 system typically operates without physical
intervention for months at a time.
5.1 Central detector
The central detector, seen in Fig. 2, consists of four identical stainless steel
cells, each with inner dimensions of ≈ 43 cm by ≈ 43 cm by ≈ 98 cm, filled
with ≈ 0.64 tons of liquid scintillator. Stainless steel was used rather than
the more typical acrylic to avoid any possibility of attack by the scintillator
on the container walls, and subsequent leakage of the flammable scintillator.
To improve reflectivity, the sides and bottom of each cell are lined with foil
wrapped acrylic sheets. To increase the fraction of totally internally reflected
(TIR) light, these sheets were sealed within transparent FluorinatedEthylene-
Propylene (FEP) bags filled with Argon [15]. The bags make it difficult to
measure the detector volume to high precision, resulting in a ≈ 10% uncer-
tainty in this quantity. However, this is of no consequence for our relative
measurement of the reactor antineutrino flux.
We use scintillator remaining after the completion of the Palo Verde antineu-
trino detection experiment [16]. This scintillator has a density of 0.856 g cm−3
and is 13% hydrogen by weight. The development and characteristics of this
scintillator are described in detail elsewhere [17].
Scintillation light generated by the interaction of particles in the cells propa-
gates to 9 inch hemispherical Photonis XP1802 photomultiplier tubes (PMTs)
by means of an acrylic coupling cylinder submerged in the liquid and extend-
ing through an opaque acrylic lid. There are two PMTs mounted on each cell
(not shown in Fig. 2).
5.2 Passive Shielding
Both gamma ray and neutron fluxes in the central detector are reduced by
passive water or polyethylene shielding which surrounds the detector on six
sides. The water is contained in acrylic tanks, supported by perforated angle
stainless steel racks. On average the passive layer is ≈ 0.5 m thick. An MCNP
simulation predicts that a shield of this thickness reduces the flux of 10 MeV
neutrons and 2 MeV gamma rays by factors of 25 and 10 respectively.
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Fig. 2. A cut away diagram of the SONGS1 detector, showing the major subsystems.
5.3 Muon Veto
A 2 cm thick plastic scintillator envelope identifies and rejects cosmic ray
muons. As shown in Fig. 2, the envelope is comprised of scintillator paddles of
different sizes placed on five sides of the detector, read out by photomultiplier
tubes. The paddles are wrapped first with aluminum foil to enhance reflectivity
and then with black tape for light tightness.
For the top, horizontally oriented paddles, the well separated muon peak was
identified in the paddle energy distribution, at its expected location of 5 MeV.
The energy threshold defining a muon was set three sigma below this peak,
with the sigma defined by a fit to the rising lobe of the Landau-distributed
muon spectrum. This procedure introduces a small amount of contamination
from the tail of the paddle gamma ray distribution, which extends above
3 MeV, but the total deadtime introduced by the muon veto even with this
contamination remains small. Due to the geometry of muon interactions, the
muon spectrum in the vertically oriented paddles has no clear peak. Thresholds
in vertically oriented paddles were set relative to the rates in the horizontal
paddles, by assuming a cos2(θ) distribution for the muon flux, which predicts
that the flux through a vertically oriented paddle should be 50% that of a
horizontally oriented paddle. The total rate at which muons are recorded by
this system is ≈ 500 Hz.
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6 Expected Antineutrino Rates
The number of detected antineutrino interactions in the detector is directly










In this equation, Nν¯ is the number of detected antineutrino interactions in a
time interval T. Np is the number of target protons in the detector, D is the
distance from the detector to the center of the reactor core, fi is the number
of fissions per second from the ith isotope. In practice the index runs over the
four dominant fissioning isotopes 235U, 238U, 239Pu and 241Pu, which account
for ≈ 99.9% of fissions in a typical reactor. σ and φi, both depending on the
antineutrino energy Eν¯ , are respectively the cross-section for the inverse beta
interaction, and the number density per MeV and fission for the ith isotope.
ǫ is the energy dependent intrinsic detection efficiency. The integral extends
over all antineutrino energies above the 1.8 MeV threshold of the inverse beta
interaction.
With our current 0.64 ± 0.06 ton liquid scintillator detector at a standoff of
24.5± 1 m from the reactor core, and with the reactor parameters defined in
Sec. 3, the rate predicted by Eq. 2 at the beginning of the reactor fuel cycle
is approximately 3800± 440 antineutrino interactions per day for a perfectly
efficient detector.
7 Electronics and Data Acquisition System
Fig. 3 shows the architecture of the data acquisition and trigger. As mentioned
earlier, there are two PMTs per scintillator cell. Custom preamplifiers built
into the bases of the PMTs produce tail pulses that are sent to a CAEN N568
spectroscopy amplifier for shaping. The approximately Gaussian shaped out-
put of the N568 is passed directly to two CAEN V785 peak sensing Analog-
to-Digital-Converters (ADCs).
A fast amplified signal from the N568 amplifier is passed to a CAEN V812
Constant Fraction Discriminator (CFD) module. Hardware thresholds are set
at≈ 1.5 MeV for each PMT, so as to allow online calibration using the 2.6 MeV
208Tl gamma ray from the Thorium chain (Sec 9).
The anode outputs of all muon paddles are passed directly to CAEN V812
CFDs, and the OR output from these is used for vetoing and timing purposes.
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Fig. 3. The data acquisition system and trigger logic.
Gates for the ADCs are produced by the following trigger logic. A coincidence
is formed from the two discriminator outputs corresponding to the PMTs on
the same cell using an ORTEC C4020 logic module (a cell trigger – typically
120 Hz per cell). The logical OR of the four cell triggers is taken (typically
500 Hz), and combined with the logical NOT of a 20 µs long muon veto signal.
A non-retriggerable logic pulse of 3 µs duration (an acquisition trigger – typical
rate 420 Hz) is produced at this stage since this is the approximate duration
of the shaped output of the N568; accepting events with shorter separation
would only result in pulse pileup at the ADCs.
Thus, an event that causes two PMTs from any single cell to fire in coincidence,
at least 20 µs after the passage of the last muon and 3 µs after the last cell
trigger, will result in one of the ADCs being gated. Gates are generated for
each ADC in turn, so that while one ADC is digitizing (V785 digitization
time ≈ 6 µs) the other can accept another event. Gates are generated until
the 32 event buffer on each ADC is full. Once these buffers have been emptied,
the flip flop generating the alternating gates is reset so that it is known which
ADC receives the first trigger, allowing subsequent events to be formed into
correctly ordered pairs in later analysis (Sec. 10).
In similar fashion, pairs of Time-to-Amplitude-Converters (TACs) are used to
record timing information. The ORTEC 566 TACs utilized have a long 50 µs
reset time, which if used singly would result in an unacceptably large fraction
of events being recorded without timing information. Thus, start and stop
signals are alternated between a pair of TACs; the stop for one is the start for
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the other. To record the time between pairs of events (the interevent time) the
acquisition trigger serves as both the start and the stop signal. To be certain
that the combination of ADC and TAC deadtimes does not introduce a non-
uniform response, we only consider interevent times greater than 10 µs in the
analysis that follows.
To record the time to last muon, the acquisition trigger serves as the stop
signal, while the start signal is either the previous acquisition trigger or a
muon signal if that occurred sooner. This start logic is necessary since the
TACs are single shot – the production of a TAC output pulse clears the timer.
Always recording the time to last event, either muon or cell, solves this prob-
lem, but introduces about 4% extra deadtime. Both TAC signals are digitized
simultaneously with the PMT pulses by the peak sensing ADCs.
8 Detector Simulation
A high fidelity detector simulation is not necessary for the relative antineutrino
rate measurements of interest here. Indeed, this lack of reliance on simulation is
a strength in the context of the practical application of antineutrino detection
technology to safeguards. Instead, we used Monte Carlo simulations to gain
insight into the atypical particle transport properties of the SONGS1 detector,
and to estimate the efficiency of our detector.
We used the MCNPX [18] package, which simulates particle transport, but
does not model the transport of the optical photons generated in the scintil-
lation process. To account for the optical photon response, we used a simple
model that incorporates photostatistics and the measured vertical position
variation in each cell. Because the variation in light collection has an impor-
tant effect on the response function, a fuller understanding of the detector
response ultimately requires a simulation or measurement of the transport
properties of visible scintillation photons throughout the entire detector vol-
ume. However, even without these inputs, we can still estimate the energy scale
and the positron and neutron detection efficiencies, and confirm the expected
transport behavior of positrons, neutrons and gamma rays in the detector and
surrounding materials.
8.1 The Detector Simulation in MCNP
We simulated particle transport in the scintillator, the surrounding materials
including the acrylic optical couplings, the PMTs, the reflective panels in-
side the detector, the stainless steel detector walls and support structure, the
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Fig. 4. The average PMT response as a function of vertical position in a single cell.
The position is measured with respect to the top of the cell.
water shield and the plastic muon veto. Characteristic gamma rays for the
background simulation (Sec. 8.3) were propagated from a maximum depth of
0.5 m in the surrounding concrete – beyond this depth there was a negligible
chance for interaction in the detector.
8.2 The Vertical LED Scan and the Detector Optical Model
Partial characterization of the optical response of the detector was derived
from a vertical scan in one cell with a light emitting diode (LED). The LED
position was offset approximately 8 centimeters transversely from the center of
the cell. Pulse height spectra were recorded at seven positions from 10 to 90 cm
from the top of the scintillator cell. The variation in response, averaged over
the two PMTs, is plotted in Fig. 4. As seen in the figure, the response is fairly
uniform until the source is within about 20 cm of the top of the cell.
We use this data set to parameterize the effects of both photostatistics and
vertical position on the detector energy resolution. The parametrization is then
used to estimate the effect of optics on the energy resolution in the gamma
ray, neutron, and positron transport simulations described below. We model
the optical resolution function σopt(E) as:
σopt(E) = σpos(E) + σp.e.(E) = k1 · E + k2 ·
√
E (3)
Here σpos(E) represents the average effect of the vertical position on the PMT
response, and σp.e.(E) is the variation in response caused by the finite number
of photoelectrons generated in the event. A value of 0.03 for k1 is estimated
from the LED data in Fig. 4. k2, accounting for photostatistics, has a value
of 0.15, which is the typical fractional width of the LED pulse hight spectra
in the position scan.
Although horizontal variation of light collection has an important impact on
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the resolution, a horizontal scan at different heights was impractical and was
not included in the model. While this ultimately limits the fidelity of the
simulation, this simple model is sufficient to estimate the energy scale and
detection efficiencies, and confirms our main expectations about the detector
response to antineutrino events.
8.3 Gamma-ray Energy Calibration
As described in Sec. 9 the detector energy calibration is derived from a fit to
a spectral feature due to the 2.6 MeV 208Tl gamma ray from the Thorium
chain and to measured ADC pedestal values. This broad feature lies between
the Tl photopeak and Compton edge, and arises from the multiple Compton
interactions that a gamma ray is likely to undergo in the detector. The size
of the detector is such that there is a high likelihood that a large fraction of
the gamma ray energy will be lost within it. To estimate the average energy
deposited by this process, and thus the correct energy to assign the measured
position of this feature in our calibration process, we propagated gamma rays
from natural Uranium (U), Thorium (Th) and Potassium (K) in external
concrete through the detector components just described and into the active
detector volume.
Gamma interactions from U, Th, and K are all generated independently, and
a weighted sum of the resulting spectra is used to form the simulated total
gamma-ray energy spectrum. In comparing data and Monte Carlo, the relative
isotopic abundances of U, Th, and K are taken as free parameters, along with
an overall scale factor. Smearing due to position and photostatistics is fixed by
the optical model defined in Sec. 8.2. The four free parameters are optimized
by fitting to the data in the 1 to 3 MeV gamma ray calibration energy range.
The χ2 per degree of freedom for the fit is 1.2.
Fig. 5 compares the data and Monte Carlo. Once agreement is optimized in
the energy range of interest, the energy scale is set in the data by matching the
measured ADC values of the multiple Compton scatter feature to the energies
reported by the Monte Carlo. The inferred energy values for the K and Th
lines are 1.32 and 2.39 MeV respectively.
Despite the absence of a full optical model, the simulation reproduces the
main features of the data, namely the spectral features due to the multiple
Compton scattering of K and Th gamma rays, and shows reasonable fidelity
across the two orders of magnitude variation in the pulse height spectrum.
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Fig. 5. External gamma interactions as recorded in the SONGS1 detector, compared
with the MCNP simulation (solid line).
8.4 Positron Simulation
Antineutrino-generated positrons, with energies from zero to several MeV,
travel a few centimeters from their point of creation and annihilate with the
creation of two 511 keV gamma rays. We simulated positrons randomly dis-
tributed throughout the liquid scintillator volume, and tallied the total visible
energy recorded in each cell, including the positron ionization energy, and the
energy deposited by scattering of the annihilation gamma rays.
The positron energy distribution is directly related to the antineutrino energy
distribution through Eq. 1 in Sec. 4. Because the positron energy spectrum
changes as the reactor evolves, the simulated spectrum must be integrated
over the same burnup period as the actual data. In the data presented here,
this corresponds to the first 77 days of Cycle 14 of the SONGS reactor. The
variation due to the changing isotopics in the core is correctly accounted for
in our predicted spectrum.
Fig. 14(b) shows the simulated and measured positron spectra in our detector.
The fixed parameters from the optical model are used to define the effects
of position and photostatistics on the positron energy scale. The only free
parameter is an overall normalization factor.
The distributions reveal agreement at approximately the 5 % level between
data and the model. A fuller treatment of the optical response is required for
a more precise comparison. We estimate a detection efficiency of 55% ± 5%
for antineutrino generated positrons in the prompt energy range of 2.39 to
9 MeV. The uncertainty is estimated by comparing the sum of the absolute
magnitudes of bin to bin count variations between the data and Monte Carlo
spectra with the total number of data counts in the prompt energy range.
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8.5 Neutron Simulation
Neutrons from inverse beta decay within the liquid scintillator are created with
energy of order 1 keV. Subsequent elastic collisions thermalize the neutrons
until they are either captured or escape from the scintillator volume. With a
natural Gd loading of 0.1% by weight, approximately 88% of neutron captures
will be on Gd isotopes (155Gd 82%, 157Gd 18%), with the remainder capturing
on protons.
The response of the detector to thermal neutrons generated by antineutrino
interactions has an important effect on the overall efficiency. We simulated
the gamma-ray cascade from neutron capture on Gd with the DICEBOX
algorithm [19]. About 105 gamma cascades per isotope with an average mul-
tiplicity of ≈ 5 were calculated and written to a file. Our modified version of
MCNPX read in a new set of energies whenever a capture on Gd occurred.
The resulting gamma rays were then propagated isotropically from the final
neutron position, tracked, and energy deposits were tallied for each detector
cell. To estimate the efficiency for detection of neutrons from antineutrino in-
teractions, the simulated neutrons were distributed uniformly throughout the
active volume of the detector. Neutron energies were sampled from the energy
distribution of antineutrino-generated neutrons, and allowed to thermalize and
capture in the detector.
Fig. 12(b) shows a comparison of the data and Monte-Carlo, where the data are
selected using all criteria that define an antineutrino, as presented in Sec. 10.
As with the positron simulation, the only free parameter is an overall normal-
ization constant.
Again, the agreement between data and Monte Carlo is reasonable considering
the simplicity of the model. Qualitatively, the Monte Carlo confirms a key ex-
pectation for this type of detector: there is a broad range of energy depositions
arising from the Gd capture, which extends well below the 8 MeV total energy
of the gamma ray cascade. The peak near 2.2 MeV due to capture on hydrogen
is seen in the simulation, as well as a large number of events that deposit very
little energy in the detector due to leakage. The broad response function to
Gd captures is due to the fact that the shower spatial extent, defined by the
typical 1–2 MeV energies of the gamma rays in the cascade, is of the order of
the detector size. This means that only those interactions in the center of the
detector will have a significant probability of depositing all of their energy in
the detector. Interactions away from the detector center are likely to lose one
or more gamma rays outside the detector volume, resulting in a lower visible
energy deposition and accounting for the broad energy spectrum seen in the








-Livetime 92 ± 0.5%
-Muon veto 91 ± 0.2%
-tmin = 10 µs 70 ± 0.5%
Fiducial 83± 4%
Total 10.7 ± 1.5%
Based on the Monte Carlo, we estimate a detection efficiency of 40 % ± 4 %
for antineutrino generated neutrons in the delayed energy region of 3.5 to
10 MeV.
8.6 Predicted Detection Efficiency
Aside from the prompt and delayed energy thresholds, the detection efficiency
is also affected by the PMT asymmetry cut, the interevent and muon timing
selection cuts and the deadtime of the DAQ. As described in Sec. 10, the
interevent time distribution of antineutrino interactions is described by an
exponential decay. We estimate the efficiency of this portion of our DAQ by
integrating this exponential over the range of accepted interevent times (10–
800 µsec). The fractional dead time imposed by the muon veto is given by
the product of the 100 µs width veto with the sum of the trigger and muon
rates (Sec. 7). Our means of estimating the fiducial volume of the detector, as
defined by an analysis cut, is described in Sec. 10.2.
Table 1 shows the estimated efficiencies through each of our selection criteria,
and the resulting total efficiency. It is interesting to note that even with the 40–
50 % efficiency through the positron and neutron cuts, the underlying event
rate is still high enough to give several hundred antineutrino events per day
in our detector. When combined with the expected antineutrino interaction
rate in our detector (Sec. 6) this efficiency allows us to estimate the number
of antineutrino events that we should observe: 407± 75 /day.
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9 Detector Calibration
Energy and time calibrations are performed periodically for each PMT-ADC
pair and each TAC. The time scale is fixed by exercising each TAC with known
fixed-interval start-and-stop pulses created by a pulse generator.
Relative calibration for each PMT-ADC pair and correction for long term
drifts depends primarily on the interaction of the 2.6 MeV 208Tl gamma ray
from the Thorium chain with the detector. This gamma ray activity arises
from the concrete walls and floor of the tendon gallery. Multiple Compton
scatters of the gamma ray in the detector and surrounding material produce
a broad spectral feature in the measured pulse height spectrum (Fig. 6).
The location of this feature, which is well fit by a gaussian, and the location of
the electronic pedestal value (defined as the ADC channel measured for zero
input voltage to the ADC) is automatically determined from each hour’s data
file. Since the signals from all cells are digitized when any one cell triggers, a
large number of recorded events for a particular cell will have zero energy, i.e.
will be a measurement of the energy pedestal (negligible electronic cross-talk
is observed between PMTs). Calibration constants are applied for each PMT-
ADC pair separately. The calibration procedure is as follows: determine the
location of the energy pedestal; rebin the energy spectrum from 4000 channels
to 800 channels; apply the PMT ratio cut described in Sec. 10 with a ratio
of 0.1; fit the 208Tl gamma ray feature to the sum of two exponentials and a
Gaussian peak.
A more restrictive PMT ratio cut is used in the calibration procedure (0.1)
than in the analysis used to extract candidate antineutrino events (0.4). While
this means that the calibration samples only a subset (≈ 70%) of the volume
in which antineutrinos are counted, the subsequent improvement in energy
resolution and gamma ray feature definition (Fig. 6) allow for a considerably
more reliable determination of its position. This is a more important consid-
eration for this detector, since we are more concerned with the stability of
our analysis energy thresholds than with having a calibration that is averaged
over the entire analyzed volume. Since we have no indication that the relative
optical transport between the different volumes sampled by the calibration
and the more general analysis has altered we are confident that it is consistent
to apply this calibration to all events.
Once the ADC bin locations of both the pedestal and 208Tl gamma ray feature
are determined, an absolute calibration is imposed. The nominal energy of the
208Tl gamma ray differs from the measured value in the detector due to energy
leakage and other effects. To set the absolute energy scale, we performed a
Monte Carlo simulation of gamma transport in the detector, as described
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Fig. 6. A representative calibration spectrum from PMT 1, ADC 1 (solid). For
comparison, the spectrum that results from accepting PMT ratios as great as 0.4 is
also shown (dotted).
in Sec. 8. The location of the 208Tl gamma ray feature is expected to be
at 2.39 MeV. The error in this calibration procedure results in an error of
≈ 27 keV at 2.39 MeV and ≈ 40 keV at 3.5 MeV, which are the energy
thresholds used in later analysis for prompt and delayed events, respectively.
The calibrated PMT values for a cell are added to determine the energy of
events in that cell in later analysis.
10 Antineutrino Event Selection
As described above, the 10 data items comprising an event are recorded when-
ever both PMTs attached to a single cell produce a signal exceeding the hard-
ware thresholds. These are the ADC values for each of the 8 PMTs and both
the time since the last acquisition trigger and the time since either the last
acquisition trigger or the last muon veto hit, which ever is less. Events are
streamed to disk soon after they are recorded.
Events are written to disk sequentially, with a new file created every hour. All
analysis operations are performed on this unit of data. The product of this
analysis is a reduced data set that can be combined across many hours, as
the task at hand requires, and transmitted efficiently over a low bandwidth
datalink for remote monitoring purposes.
10.1 Preliminary Analysis
As described in Sec. 4, we are looking for two energy depositions, arising from
the positron and neutron interactions, in close time coincidence. The first step
in the analysis is to form candidate event pairs from the raw singles data. For
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every pair of sequential events, the first is labeled “prompt,” or positron-like,
and the second is labeled “delayed,” or neutron-like. Two time intervals are
also recorded: the time before the prompt event that the most recent muon
veto or acquisition trigger occurred and the time between the prompt and
delayed events (interevent time).
A complete hour of data taking typically comprises≈ 1.4 million prompt/delayed
pairs. Several items of interest are derived from this complete data set:
• the total number of acquisition triggers recorded in the hour,
• the interevent time spectrum of the entire data set is histogramed, and fit
to an exponential to determine the acquisition trigger rate for that hour,
• the calibration constants for the PMT channels are determined as described
in Sec. 9.
The next step in the analysis is to reduce the data set by applying an en-
ergy cut to the event pairs. To collect data for the automated calibration the
discriminator thresholds are set well below the energy of the 2.6 MeV 208Tl
background line. However, as will be discussed below, the final antineutrino
analysis thresholds must be set higher, since the background rate is too high
at lower energies. Thus, a loose precut is made that requires greater than
2.0 MeV in both the prompt and delayed portions of an event, reducing the
size of the data set that must be subsequently analysed by more than an order
of magnitude.
10.2 Event Selection
To select antineutrino candidates we apply several further cuts.
In order to remove a strong position dependency in the light collection effi-
ciency in our scintillator cells, a cut is applied to the ensure that each PMT
in a cell sees a similar amount of light per event. An example of the light
intensity seen by each PMT in a cell is shown in Fig. 7. Two clear features can
be seen – a line along PMTA = PMTB, where an event occurs in the lower
or middle portion of the cell so that the PMTs observe similar amounts of
light, and large numbers of events on the “wings” where the light distribution
is uneven. In those latter events the interaction point is closer to one PMT
than the other resulting in uneven light collection, as well as a higher overall
light collection efficiency that results in an incorrect energy assignment.
For this reason, we remove events with an uneven light distribution. This cut
19
Fig. 7. Counts as a function of the share of energy in each PMT.
is applied to the normalized ratio of the two calibrated PMT intensities,
r =
∣∣∣∣PMTA − PMTBPMTA + PMTB
∣∣∣∣ < 0.4, (4)
so that when the two PMTs observe similar intensity this quantity is small.
The effect of this cut on the energy spectrum of singles in a cell is demonstrated
in Fig. 8. Many events with apparent high energies are removed – in reality
these are low energy singles that occur close to one PMT, yielding a higher
light collection than events in the bulk of the scintillator cell. Thus, the effect
of this cut is to exclude a volume close to the PMTs.
A GEANT4 [20] simulation was used to estimate the size of the remaining
fiducial volume. Optical photons were generated throughout the cell volume,
the number reaching each PMT recorded, and the PMT ratio cut applied. The
simulation was repeating using several values for the scintillator attenuation
length and cell wall reflectivity consistent with the LED scan shown in Fig. 4.
The result was quite insensitive to these changes, and it is estimated that
events in 83± 4% of the cell volume will pass this cut.
Next, we apply energy cuts to the amount of energy recorded in each cell. In
this analysis we consider each scintillator cell to be an independent detector,
i.e. we require that both the prompt and delayed energy distributions exceed
an analysis threshold, and do not consider simultaneous energy depositions
in any other cell. Because both the prompt and delayed energy depositions
from an inverse beta interaction include gamma rays, energy can in fact be
transported to adjacent scintillator cells, particularly for the delayed event
(gamma ray shower following neutron capture on Gd). However, the energy
sharing effect is relatively small – we have determined that considering the
20
Fig. 8. The energy spectrum of a scintillator cell before (solid) and after (dotted)
the PMT ratio cut is applied.
energy sum of all cells in the delayed energy determination would add only
≈ 10% to the antineutrino count rate. This comes at the expense of increased
complexity and that all scintillator cell/PMT combinations must be fully op-
erational during the entire data taking period. For simplicity and flexibility in
our analysis, we have chosen to consider each cell as an independent detector.
The lower energy thresholds for prompt and delayed events are optimized with
respect to the long term stability of the threshold and the signal to background
ratio. A lower threshold admits more of the desired antineutrino events but
increases the number of uncorrelated background events, whose subtraction
introduces considerable statistical uncertainty. In the two parameter space
described by the prompt and delayed thresholds there is a fairly broad mini-
mum in the statistical uncertainty in the number of correlated events. (Fig. 9).
This gives us some freedom to choose thresholds values based on the stability
criterion.
For the prompt event the lower threshold is set at the clearly identifiable
2.39 MeV calibration feature. This reduces the dependence of the analysis
on the energy calibration, since no extrapolation of the energy scale from
the measured calibration point is required. The delayed energy threshold is
set at 3.5 MeV. With the prompt threshold set as just described, this value
for the delayed threshold is optimized with respect to minimizing statistical
uncertainty and maximizing the neutron detection efficiency.
Upper thresholds are chosen based on physical considerations. An upper thresh-
old of 9 MeV is chosen for the prompt events since there are expected to be
very few energy depositions due to reactor antineutrinos with energy greater
than this (Sec. 8.4). For the delayed event, an upper threshold of 10 MeV is
chosen, based on the expected delayed energy spectrum determined via Monte
Carlo simulations (Sec. 8.5). This value reflects the maximum energy released
by neutron capture on Gd, blurred by the energy resolution of the scintillator
cells.
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Fig. 9. The statistical uncertainty in the correlated event rate as a function of the
prompt and delayed thresholds.
Time since last muon (µs)






Fig. 10. Measured values of the time elapsed since the last muon or cell event.
Finally, we apply a cut that suppresses antineutrino-like event pairs caused
by muon interactions. Fig. 10 displays the spectrum of time since the last
muon or acquisition trigger values once all the cuts described above have been
applied. As expected for a Poisson process, the dominant feature is a simple
exponential with time constant equal to inverse the rate at which events occur,
in this case the sum of the muon veto hit rate and the acquisition trigger rate.
At shorter times there are additional events that are correlated with muon
hits in the veto – it is these that we must be careful to eliminate. For this
reason we apply a cut on this value, considering only those events that occur
at least 100 µs after the last muon hit/acquisition trigger. From the measured
time constant of the muon correlated events (20 µs), we calculate that this cut
excludes all but 0.7% of events correlated with a muon recorded in the veto.
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Interevent Time (µs)








Fig. 11. A representative interevent time spectrum of event pairs that pass all se-
lection cuts acquired during 7 days of data taking.
10.3 Antineutrino count rate determination
After applying these cuts, we then examine the interevent time spectrum
(Fig. 11). Two clear exponential features are visible. The first and most inter-
esting is that due to correlated pairs of events, a positron-like energy deposi-
tion followed a characteristic time later by the capture of a neutron on a Gd
nucleus. The second exponential is that due to random coincidences of sequen-
tial background events that both exceed the relevant thresholds. As would be
expected for such event pairs, the time constant of this exponential is equal
to the acquisition trigger rate.
Because it is impossible in this detector to distinguish random coincidences
from true correlated event pairs on an event-by-event basis, we use a statistical
separation of the two to determine the correlated (antineutrino-like) event rate.
This is achieved by fitting the spectrum displayed in Fig. 11 to the sum of two
exponentials. The two time constants are known in advance; the uncorrelated
rate is measured from the raw data, and the neutron capture time constant is
measured from a high statistics data set (28.6± 0.3 µs). Thus, we need only





then yield the number of event pairs that fall into each class. The fit is imple-
mented using the CERN MINUIT package [21], using full error propagation,
so that bin-to-bin statistical errors are correctly applied in determining the
best fit exponential amplitudes and their uncertainties.
The energy spectra of the prompt and delayed portions of correlated events





































Fig. 12. Energy spectra of correlated events (delayed in this example) are obtained
using a statistical separation. (a) The average energy spectrum of uncorrelated
events is determined using events with long interevent time (dotted) and is then
subtracted from spectra determined at short interevent times (solid). This yields
the average energy spectrum of the correlated events (b). The solid line shows the
neutron energy spectrum predicted by the Monte Carlo, including the expected
feature at ≈ 2.2 MeV due to capture on hydrogen.
due to our inability to distinguish correlated and uncorrelated events on an
event-by-event basis. The procedure used is demonstrated for the delayed case
in Fig. 12. The average energy spectra for uncorrelated events are determined
from events with long interevent times (400 − 800 µs), while the sum of the
average energy spectra for correlated and uncorrelated events is determined
from those with short interevent times (10−100 µs). The uncorrelated spectra
are scaled so that there are equal numbers of uncorrelated events in both the
short and long time energy spectra, and are then subtracted from the short
time spectra, yielding the average correlated energy spectra.
11 Confirmation of Reactor Antineutrino Detection
Having extracted the number of correlated events, we then wish to determine
what fraction of those are due to antineutrino interactions. Unfortunately we
have no means to distinguish these from correlated backgrounds, such as those
caused by fast neutrons. Instead, we must wait for the antineutrino source, the
SONGS Unit 2 reactor, to turn off. This occurs approximately every 1.5 years
during regularly scheduled refueling outages, as well as occasionally for inspec-
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Interevent Time (µs)












Fig. 13. Interevent time spectra acquired over 7 days with the Unit 2 reactor off
(dashed) and on (solid).
Table 2
Comparison of measurements with the Unit 2 reactor on and off.
Reactor State Off On
Uncorrelated Events 3732 ± 25 /day 3785 ± 26 /day
Correlated Events 105 ± 9 /day 564± 13 /day
DAQ trigger rate 420± 1 Hz 418± 1 Hz
Muon veto rate 506± 1 Hz 503± 1 Hz
tions or brief unscheduled maintenance operations. With the Unit 2 reactor
off the detector counts correlated background events and a small number of
antineutrino interactions from the relatively distant Unit 3.
Fig. 13 displays the interevent time spectra for two 7 day periods in April and
May of 2006. In the first period, Unit 2 was at zero power for refueling. During
this time around 100 correlated events pass all selection cuts. In the second,
refueling was completed and the reactor was operating at full power.
Clearly, there are many more correlated events when the reactor is on, com-
pared to when the reactor is off. Also, the uncorrelated portion of the in-
terevent time spectrum is unaltered by the change in reactor state, as are the
detector trigger and muon veto rate. The number of correlated and uncorre-
lated events contained in the two spectra is compared in Table 2. The reactor
off measurement is essentially a measurement of the correlated background
rate. It comprises less than 20% of the correlated event rate, giving good sig-
nal to noise for a measurement of the reactor antineutrino rate. The 7 day
average of the observed antineutrino detection rate, 459± 16 /day, is in good
agreement with that predicted, 407± 75 /day.
To further confirm that we are observing reactor antineutrinos, we can also
examine the prompt event energy spectrum during reactor on and off periods

























































Fig. 14. (a) The energy spectrum of prompt correlated events with the Unit 2 reactor
on (solid) and off (dotted). The logarithmic insert clearly shows the agreement
between the two spectra at energies greater than 9 MeV. (b) The inferred inverse
beta positron energy spectrum derived by subtracting the reactor off data from
the reactor on data. The solid line shows the Monte Carlo prediction, including
transport effects and the simple optical model.
spectrum of the correlated backgrounds, while with the reactor on we measure
the sum of these backgrounds and the prompt antineutrino interaction energy
deposition.
As discussed in Sec. 4 the prompt energy deposition in an inverse beta inter-
action is essentially that of the incoming antineutrino. The expected prompt
energy spectrum was given in Sec. 8.4; we expect the distribution to go to zero
at around 10 MeV. This is what we observe in Fig. 14a – above this energy
the reactor on and reactor off distributions agree.
Furthermore, we can determine the prompt energy spectrum of the reactor
correlated events (Fig. 14b), and compare it to that expected from the Monte
Carlo calculation (Sec. 8.4). The agreement is good, again confirming that we
are indeed detecting reactor antineutrinos.
In principle, the highest energy neutrons in the reactor spectrum could create
a correlated antineutrino-like signal in the detector in that same way that fast
neutrons produced by cosmic rays do. However, as noted in Sec. 3, this rate is
negligible, since reactor fast and thermal neutrons from the core are completely
attenuated by the ≈ 20 m of concrete between the core and the detector. The
reactor associated gamma flux at the detector location is similarly negligible.
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12 Conclusion
Our deployment of an antineutrino detector at a nuclear reactor has shown
that even a cubic meter scale detector of modest efficiency can easily measure
hundreds of antineutrino events per day, a large enough count rate to be of in-
terest for cooperative monitoring regimes. Of particular interest is the relative
smallness of the detector compared to many other modern reactor antineutrino
detectors. (These earlier detectors have typically used larger active volumes to
improve containment of the spatially diffuse neutron-induced gamma shower,
while we have sacrificed some efficiency to reduce our overall footprint.) We
have also shown that the detector can operate for months to years with only
very occasional maintenance needed by the safeguards inspector. This is an
important point since inspector-days dominate the cost of reactor safeguards
regimes. Calibrations can be performed using omnipresent gamma ray back-
grounds, without the need for external check sources. Concerning stability of
response, we have been able to use scintillator mixed several years prior to our
experiment, for two years running, with no observable reduction in response
due to aging. This perhaps surprising result again relates to the smallness of
our detector, where the typical travel paths for scintillation photons are only
of the order 1-2 meters compared to several meters or tens of meters in other
experiments. Our impact on day-to-day operations at the reactor site has been
negligible, an important consideration for gaining acceptance by reactor op-
erators. As far as the deployment site itself is concerned, as noted above in
Sec. 3, we are gratified to have found that many reactors around the world ap-
pear to possess annular galleries with overburden and standoff characteristics
similar to the ones enjoyed in our own installation.
In summary, our initial experience with deployment augurs well for the near-
term utility of this novel reactor safeguards tool. Shortly, we will also publish
analyses of our current data set quantifying the precision with which thermal
power and fissile content can be measured with the SONGS1 design.
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